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This paper urges contemporary Business Ethicists to reconsider the relationship between habit 
and virtue in the light of recent debates between contemporary philosophers and scientists. 
Synthesizing insights from current Neuroscience, from 20th century American Pragmatism and 
from 19th century French Aristotelianism, this emergent intellectual tradition proposes a 
dynamic account of habit’s embodiment which we will first describe and then advocate. Two 
recurring suggestions within this habit renaissance are of particular relevance to Business 
Ethicists: firstly, that there is a ‘plastic’ structure pertaining to habit and, secondly, that there 
is a processual ‘double-law of habituation’. Taken together, these nuanced accounts of habit 
and habituation provide virtue ethicists with a basis for claiming analytic and pragmatic 
authority within applied ethics debates in general and within Business Ethics debates in 
particular. We develop this argument in three steps. Firstly, we elaborate upon why habits are 
said to be plastic and why the process of habituation is said to be characterised by a double-
law. Secondly, we distinguish this account of habit’s relationship to virtue from, and where 
necessary defend it against, the influential articulations of the habit: virtue relationship 
provided by situationism, by deontology and by communitarianism, respectively. Finally, we 
draw practical lessons from the initial elaborations made in the argument’s first step, and the 
subsequent clarifications provided in its second step, by announcing seven characteristics of 












The nature of habit’s relationship to virtue has long provided an intriguing puzzle to Business 
Ethicists (Ferrero and Sison 2014, Betta 2018). For not only are our habits a series of 
dispositions which allow each of us to cope with the otherwise inordinate complexity of life, 
they also play an indispensable role in how we distinguish between the right and the wrong. 
Any coordinated effort to cultivate habits which brackets out the mundane fact that habits are 
constantly being formed within and beyond formal organisations must fall on the sword of its 
own hubris. This isn’t to say that all coordinated efforts to cultivate habits are doomed in 
advance: far from it. It is only to recognise the truism which many theorists have already 
established and many practitioners have already experienced: the relationship between future 
aspirations and existing habits is neither causal nor linear. And so the success of any 
organisational change management programme, ethical or otherwise, will be at least as much 
a product of what individuals do automatically as by what they do after conscious deliberation. 
In this paper we argue that Business Ethicists concerned with intervening at the level of habit 
have much to gain from recent interdisciplinary discoveries into the nature of habit.   
 
Our lives are a tightly woven fabric of habits which provide us with stability and direction. Our 
habits both get us up and get up with us in the morning: pouring our coffees, taking us to our 
offices, scheduling our meetings, answering our emails, negotiating our interactions, ordering 
our lunches, determining where we eat it, propelling us through the rest of the day and then 
bringing us back home again. Our habits don’t even get to clock off when we do. They also 
accompany us throughout the beers we drink, the sports we play, the culture which entertains 
us and the bedtime stories with which we lull our kids – and often ourselves - to sleep. For it is 
our habits, as Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, which shield us from an otherwise unbearable life of 
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incessant improvisation (2006, 129). It is our habits, that is, which ensure that a metaphysical 
distinction exists between us and the essentially impressionable will o’ the wisp. 
 
Although prevalent throughout all of our lifetimes, our habits do not ultimately determine what 
each of us amount to. That’s because we all have the capacity to reflect upon where our habits 
have gotten us and to speculate as to where others might bring us instead. We all devise 
mechanisms to weed bad habits out of existence, for the sake of nourishing better ones into 
being, in other words. To paraphrase Catherine Malabou (2008), habit is both a medicine and 
a poison: at its best it is the grace guiding a meaningful life while at its worst it is the addiction 
which annihilates all meaning.  So a fitter, happier, and more productive life would be one 
made up of good habits, we know, but such a life, those who have tried and failed to lead it 
will know, is much easier willed than lived. This means that the virtuous subject is a creature 
of habit for which those habits are an issue. 
 
William James (1890, 105) was among the first to postulate the ‘plastic’ structure of the habit 
forming subject: “weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at 
once”, as he so eloquently put it (above). Plastic is viscously impressionable without being 
formless, it is stable though not brittle and it moves but does not flow. This quite precise 
material imagery, as Claire Carlisle proposes, is far from a merely poetic or rhetorical 
achievement on James’s part: “Our capacity to acquire habits testifies to this plasticity insofar 
as it rests on the twin conditions of receptivity and resistance to change” (2013, 31). James’s 
work has proven indispensable within a burgeoning renaissance in habit research (e.g. 
Barandiaran and Di Paolo 2014; Bennett et al 2013 Carlisle 2014; Sparrow and Hutchinson 
2013) taking inspiration from 20th Century American Pragmatism (principally the work of 
William James and John Dewey) and from 19th Century French Aristotelianism (principally 
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Felix Ravaisson’s Of Habit). Many of the concerns which continue to characterize Business 
Ethics debates, we will claim, should be restated with respect to how this habit research 




It was Aristotle, of course, who did most to establish the virtue ethics framework within which 
these diverse intellectual traditions are now re-converging: ‘having a habit’, he wrote, means 
having ‘a disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed’ 
(Aristotle 1924, book 5, part 20). For Aristotle, the virtues are personal capacities which we 
learn, improve upon and eventually excel at, over time, through iterative practice. Moral virtue, 
for contemporary Aristotelians, is therefore ‘not an innate trait, but a disposition acquired by 
the continuous repetition of virtuous acts’ (Morales-Sánchez and Cabello-Medina 2015, 159). 
These habitual acts amount to “a ‘second nature’ for human beings” (Sison and Ferrero 2015, 
83). To become virtuous is to cultivate the habits which best epitomise excellence within a 
given context (Solomon 1993) and contemporary virtue ethicists habitually teach us that: 
 
you cannot become a good person by studying ethics as a purely philosophical subject: 
that would be like trying to achieve health by listening to what a physician has to say 
about health and not acting accordingly (Aristotle, 2000, c.f. Hartman 2013, 172).  
 
The material imagery provided by Félix Ravaisson’s ‘double-law of habit’ and by John 
Dewey’s relational account of habit formation, we’ll argue, provides contemporary virtue 
ethicists with a means of responding to three of their most outspoken critics: situationist social-
psychologists; deontological ethicists and communitarian analysts. According to the chief 
6 
 
proponents of the contemporary habit renaissance, there is much more nuance within the 
potential claims which habit can make upon virtue than its traditional critics have been ready 
to admit. We concur and close our argument by outlining seven important issues which 
organisational habit changers need to consider: what we call the seven characteristics of highly 
effective virtue habituation projects. 
 
THE PLASTICITY OF HABIT IN NEUROLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
We are all, Hegel suggested “accustomed to the idea of habit”, but it is nevertheless difficult 
“to determine the Notion of habit” (Hegel 1971, 410). Habit, for its possessors and its analysts 
alike, is both familiar and uncanny: we all experience it and yet we all struggle to explain what 
that experience is like. Recent philosophical work suggests that Hegel’s plastic articulation of 
the nature of mind is compatible with established developments within social psychology and 
neuro-science (Malabou 2005; Bernacer, and Murillo 2014). Charles Duhigg’s business 
oriented account of habit, by contrast, reduces all that seemed so complex within Hegel’s 
philosophy of mind to a circular movement involving just three moments: a cue, a routine, and 
a reward (Duhigg 2012).  
 
Consider the phone call. It rings, you answer and someone asks how you are. Over time, the 
response (phone answering), to the cue (phone ringing), becomes cognitively associated with 
the reward (sympathetic dialogue). This is Duhigg’s ‘habit-loop’. The process of habit 
formation, for him, is a mind-weak and eventually mind-less mechanical process of act 
repetition: ‘the cue and reward become intertwined until a powerful sense of anticipation and 
craving emerges’ (2012, 19). Duhigg’s account of the anticipation and craving characteristic 
of the habit-loop draws heavily upon Anna Graybiel’s neurological analyses of the brain’s 
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plasticity (see Duhigg 2012, 296). Graybiel’s work brings us closer to the sense for what 
philosophy can contribute to our understanding of habit’s plasticity.  
 
In one of Graybiel’s experiments, ‘rats were trained to run a T-maze task in which they were 
cued to turn right or left to receive reward’ (2008, 376). After a week, patterns were regularised 
throughout the maze, brain activity was reduced and rewards were more effortlessly received. 
This is an empirical instance of what Graybiel (2008, 359) calls ‘experience-dependent 
plasticity’. For neurological researchers such as Graybiel, the notion of plasticity indicates that 
our brain is capable of changing itself over time. It was first introduced by Donald Hebb  in 
opposition to Pavlovian accounts of psychological conditioning (Carlisle 2014). Rather than 
saying that psychologists should reduce their object to chains of stimulus and response, Hebb 
and the neurological studies which his work inspired treated habit-formation as a dispositional 
matter, demonstrating how plasticity exists not heuristically but materially, at the level of the 
brain’s synapses.  
 
This notion of the brain’s plasticity indicates how a non-mechanistic embodied materialism 
characterises habit formation. The formation of a habit-loop is, on this account, not an 
automatic outcome of rewards following from cues because individual agency also plays an 
important role within habituation. According to Catherine Malabou, plasticity combines 
resistance to change and receptivity to it (2005). She proceeds to draw philosophical 
consequences from the recent neuroscientific research which demonstrates that brains both 
form habits, and are also formed by habits. Like the rat running through the maze, our neural 
networks are formed through the repetition of actions. This repetitious process of habituation, 
in turn, facilitates future action. Habits, as Carlisle writes, ‘develop when a repeated change, 
such as a movement or a sensation, makes a difference to a being’s constitution’ (2014, 12). A 
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habit might be the mere repetition of almost identical actions but this repetition makes a 
qualitative difference to the subject, it changes that subject’s very composition, and it does this 
in a material – that is to say embodied – sense.   
 
What are the practical consequences of habit’s empirically demonstrable plasticity? 
Neuroscientific accounts of the role played by the brain synapses within habit-formation, as 
Carlisle puts it ‘will not by itself lead to human flourishing’ (2010, 142). So what can we say 
about plasticity, not as brain scientists but as applied ethicists in general and as Business 
Ethicists in particular? “A good human life”, Carlisle continues, “can be lived in ignorance of 
scientific theory, but not in ignorance of habit” (ibid.). This recent neuroscience suggests 
James’s and Hegel’s earlier intuitions concerning habit’s plasticity remain instructive. This 
insight underpins what now follows: a consideration of the moral consequences of habit’s 
plasticity.  
 
THE DOUBLE LAW OF HABITUATION  
As Carlisle (2014; 2013; 2010), Sparrow and Hutchinson (2013) and Sinclair (2015) have 
insisted, Felix Ravaisson 1838 essay De l’habitude provides an indispensable yet often over 
looked account of habit’s moral ambivalence. Stated briefly, his work explains how habits 
organise our body and our brain, within an Aristotelian framework. Business Ethicists would 
do well to pay it attention. 
 
From the outset of his study, Ravaisson indicates that habit combines constancy and change. 
Through constant repetition, habits alter the disposition ‘in which a change occurs’ (Ravaisson 
2008, 25). To adopt a habit is to undergo a transformation in the potentiality of what one can 
do, think and feel. It is to modulate one’s character. Ravaisson (2008, 25) illustrates this point 
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about the plasticity of our body and brain through Aristotle’s example of throwing a stone into 
the air (1930). No matter how many times the stone is thrown, its natural disposition doesn’t 
change. Its physical structure may change, particularly if it is dropped, but the stone itself plays 
no active role here, on account of its inherent passivity. Human beings, in ontological contrast 
to stones, are capable of acquiring habits because they have a second nature. Unlike stones, 
which do not experience repetition as repetition, human beings have their habitual experiences 
as an issue for them. Habitual recurrences modify a conscious character, much like how 
Graybiel’s rats become changed through their habits. Habit, that is, gradually changes the 
subject’s plasticity. This is a gradual process with important moral consequences. For 
Ravaisson, following Aristotle, virtue becomes iteratively embodied through habituated 
processes:  
 
Virtue is first of all an effort and wearisome; it becomes something attractive and a 
pleasure only through practice, as a desire that forgets itself or that is unaware of itself, 
and gradually it draws near to the holiness of innocence. Such is the very secret of 
education: its art consists in attracting someone towards the good by action, thus fixing 
the inclination for it.  In this way a second nature is formed.’ (Ravaisson 2008, 59). 
 
While Ravaisson’s work on habit, according to Carlisle, theorises ‘the good life within the 
Aristotelian ethical tradition’ (2013, 20), it is also indebted to what Bishop Butler and Maine 
de Biran called ‘the double law of habit’ (Carlisle and Sinclair 2008). Habits, in accordance 
with this law, are drawn in two opposing directions: ‘the continuity or repetition of passion 
weakens it’, on the one hand, and ‘the continuity or repetition of action exalts or strengthens 
it’ (Ravaisson, 2008, 49), on the other. The processual law of habituation is double because it 
both strengthens and weakens through repetition. What was once new and technically difficult 
10 
 
- playing an instrument, riding a bike or speaking well in public, for example, becomes easier 
through habitual repetition. And yet, what was once exciting and perhaps even inspiring – a 
new guitar, a new bike, a new turn of phrase, can very easily become tedious through repetition. 
Or, in Ravaisson’s own example (2008, 51), any child can grow accustomed to noise and 
swinging sensations ushering them to sleep while another child might require peace and 
tranquillity for the very same reasons. The difference is a matter of differing processes of 
habituation.   
 
A common principle underpins the double law of habit for Ravaisson. Passivity converts into 
activity and activity into passivity on account of an ‘unreflected spontaneity’ or ‘obscure 
tendency’ that allows individuals to both anticipate and crave future changes (2008, 51). In 
passive habituation, this spontaneity manifests as a resistance to impressions coming from 
without accompanied by a craving for a missing sensation. The child trying to fall asleep forms 
a desire for the sound and movement to which she became accustomed. This is not an 
automated response, however: when the noise stops, the child realises it has stopped. In active 
habituation, on the other hand, the anticipation of change is less the result of an active choice 
and more an inclination to act. The professional footballer, for the sake of another example, 
has developed what Ravaisson would call an ‘inclination that no longer awaits the 
commandments of the will but rather anticipates them’ (2008, 51). Repetition of habit, that is 
to say training, ensures that the skilled footballer ‘increasingly anticipates both the impression 
of external objects in sensibility, and the will in activity’ (ibid., 55.).  
 
The double law of habit, Ravaisson surmises ‘can be explained only by the development of a 
Spontaneity that is at once active and passive, equally opposed to mechanical Fatality and to 
reflective Freedom’ (ibid.). This unreflected spontaneity in habit is, Ravaisson insists ‘a 
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moving middle term’ between freedom and necessity ‘which advances by an imperceptible 
progress from one extremity to the other’ (ibid., 59). Our habits might take hold beyond the 
threshold of our consciousness but what guides this process is a kind of embodied intelligence. 
Habits, then, can embody choices because habituation, for Ravaisson, is not the mechanical 
and automatic response to a cue but an embodied tendency through which effort levels are 
dissipated in their being anticipated.  
 
On the matter of virtuous habituation, then, Ravaisson explains that the formation of a virtue 
of charity, for instance, bears witness to the transformation of ‘the passive emotions of pity’ 
into the ‘helpful activity and inner joy of charity’ (Ravaisson 2008, 69).  Through charitable 
habituation we can redirect our moral choices so that we no longer rely on our receptivity to 
the passions but instead develop an almost unconscious spontaneity to act charitably. There are 
important consequences in this observation for Business Ethicists concerned with intervening 
at the level of habit, as we will discuss later.  
 
PLASTIC HABITUATION IN CONTEXT 
Around the turn of the 20th century, while working in a very different intellectual context, the 
pragmatist philosopher John Dewey affirmed Ravaissons’ intuition that habit is an habituated 
disposition which anticipates the future. He added the important observation that habituation 
occurs in a social setting. For Dewey, our habituated dispositions are formed through social 
customs, routines and rituals (see also Betta 2018). It is from these, he argued, that we draw 
our sense for what is socially acceptable and strive to act accordingly. Social conventions 
therefore play a crucial role in how we distinguish between the virtuous and the vicious (Dewey 
1922). Dewey’s addition of habit’s sociological dimension provides us with a basis for 
synthesising Ravaisson’s account of the double law of habit with a sense for habit’s plasticity. 
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For Dewey, ‘the essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response’ 
(1922, 32). This predisposition is, he suggests, much more important than our ‘vague, general, 
conscious choices’ (ibid.). All habits, as he puts it:  
 
are demands for certain kinds of activity, and they constitute the self. In any intelligible 
sense of the term they are will. They form our effective desires and they furnish us with 
our working capacities. They rule our thoughts, determining which shall appear and be 
strong and which shall pass from light into obscurity’ (1922, 21).  
 
We are our habits, Dewey suggests in line with the tradition of work which sees habit as 
malleable, in the sense that they hold us, form us, and compel us, without ultimately 
determining us. Whereas Ravaisson’s account of virtue is faithful to Aristotle’s metaphysical 
articulation, in its suggestion that a divine grace ultimately governs the double law of habit, 
Dewey’s analysis of habituation prioritizes the mundane relationship between the individual 
and the environment. Habit, as Dewey puts it, shows the individual ‘using and incorporating 
the environment in which the later has its say surely as the former’ (1922, 15). Dewey’s account 
of habit, therefore, is not teleological but ‘transactional’ (Sullivan, 2013, 236). The 
interdependent relationship between the individual and the environment out of which habits 
emerge, not a metaphysical strife towards perfection, is what ‘demonstrates their plasticity’ 
(Sullivan 2013, 239). It is habit’s plasticity, its material mixture between receptivity towards 
change and resistance to change, which constitutes the self. All of which makes it fallacious to 
conceive of habits as the effect of will power. All of which also makes it fallacious to conceive 
of habits as the automatic response to environmental stimuli. Dewey suggests that with habit, 
the response in fact precedes the stimulus (Menand, 2011). Like Ravaisson, he affirms that 
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habit has its own momentum and tendency which organises our beliefs, our attitudes and our 
will.  
 
By arguing habits are plastic, then, we follow what recent neurological researchers mean: 
resistance to change and receptivity towards change are embodied through habitual repetition. 
The moral consequences of the mechanism underpinning this process of habituation can be 
understood through what Ravaisson called the ‘double law of habit’. This double law, we 
qualified, selects not through a teleological principle but though a transactional process. The 
important applied question remains: how can this account of habit’s malleability inform 
Business Ethicists? In turning to this question now we will also engage with two intimately 
related questions. Firstly: what are the limitations of rendering virtue dependent upon habit? 
Secondly: how can these limitations be countered?  
 
OBJECTIONS TO HABIT 
Applied ethicists in general, and Business Ethicists in particular, have raised three objections 
to habit’s claims upon virtue which cannot be ignored. Firstly, there is the objection that virtues 
and habits do not exist as subjective dispositions, if at all (the Ontological Objection). 
Secondly, there is the objection that virtue has little, if anything, to do with habit (the 
Deontological Objection). Finally, there is the objection that virtues and habits are collectively, 
not individually, determined (the Communitarian Objection). We will successively outline and 
respond to each of these objections in what follows, closing the discussion with a summary 
table. We then proceed, in the following section, to posit seven practical implications of this 
section’s exegesis and defence. 
 
The Ontological Objection 
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Gillian Elizabeth Anscombe’s critical diagnosis of the Anglophone moral philosophical 
tradition helped establish the ongoing dialogue between moral philosophy and social 
psychology on which the ontological objection to virtue ethics continues to rest. “The 
differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the 
present day are of little importance” (1958, 1), Anscombe wrote. And so it is “not possible for 
us at present to do moral philosophy”, she continued, “until we have an adequate philosophy 
of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking” (ibid.). Moral philosophers should, 
Anscombe asserted, understand ethical action as a particular kind of human action in general: 
for this they require psychological concepts. Human psychology, indeed, should be understood 
as the grounds for an account of human morality, not the other way around:  
 
the proof that an unjust man is a bad man would require a positive account of justice as 
a “virtue”. This part of the subject-matter of ethics, is however, completely closed to us 
until we have an account of what type of characteristic a virtue is – a problem, not of 
ethics, but of conceptual analysis – and how it relates to the actions in which it is 
instanced: a matter which I think Aristotle did not succeed in really making clear (ibid., 
4)  
 
Anscombe claimed that virtue ethics, while not without its shortcomings, was compatible with 
a psychologically nuanced moral philosophy. She affirmed this against the divine proposals 
behind “legalistic” systems of ethical obligation (1958, 3-7), against the “absurd” proposals 
within Kantian deontology (1958, 2), against the “flawed” proposals throughout Bentham and 
Mill’s utilitarianisms (1958, 3), and against the “vulgar” proposals made by Sidgwick in “the 
transition from Mill to Moore” (1958, 9). Her multiple tradition defying stance 
notwithstanding, Anscombe went on to concede both that she herself was not capable of 
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synthesising virtue ethics with psychology, and to question whether any of her contemporaries 
were appropriately disposed (1958, 14). At stake within any modern moral philosophical 
revival, she declared, was nothing less than a return to “how Plato and Aristotle talk”, a return 
which needed to be mindful of the many dead-ends already encountered since the Ancient 
Greeks: 
 
it can be seen that philosophically there is a huge gap, at present unfillable as far as we 
are concerned, which needs to be filled by an account of human nature, human action, 
the type of characteristic a virtue is, and above all of human “flourishing”. And it is the 
last concept that appears most doubtful (1958, 15).  
 
The challenge Anscombe laid down to her successors was that of explaining, through the ‘is’ 
of psychology and the ‘ought’ of virtue ethics, the very existence of any good and just character, 
that is, the very existence of any character “who habitually refuses to commit or participate in 
any unjust actions for fear of any consequences, or to obtain any advantage, for himself or 
anybody else” (1958, 14). Attempts to fill this daunting though not insurmountable gap persist 
today in a fractious rather than synthetic debate. “Situationism”, in particular, has established 
its psychological findings in opposition to virtue ethics (e.g. Doris and Stich 2005; Harman 
1999, 2003; Merritt, 2000). Both virtues and habits are explained by the situationist as 
epiphenomenal behaviours which are entirely reducible to the contextual phenomenology, 
hence ‘the ontological objection’. 
 
Situationists also reduce ethical business practices to environmental factors. Take the virtue of 
honesty. In order to explain the very existence of an honest character, as Anscombe would have 
us do, we would require not only an account of the virtue of honesty but also an explanatory 
16 
 
account of any character’s honesty’s ‘behavioural consistency’ (Alzola, 2008, 344). Where 
does any character’s honesty’s consistency come from? For the situationist, honesty is an 
entirely ‘unreflective response’ (Morales-Sánchez and Cabello-Medina 2015,160). What goes 
for honesty here can also go for any of the so-called virtues. Behavioural consistency, 
situationism teaches, is predominately if not exclusively mindless, that is to say, predominately 
if not exclusively situationally attributable. Habit might well be “a tool for character 
development”, as Alavudeen et al put it, but it is a tool which has very little if anything to do 
with “conscious choice and affirmation” (2008, 9).  
 
The Milgram and Stanford Prison experiments are routinely cited in support of this 
scientifically demonstrated if morally bleak conclusion. Taken alongside the conclusions of 
other social-psychological experiments which provide the basis for situationist interventions – 
the ‘Good Samaritan’ experiment in particular - they challenge the faith we might have in 
virtue. Harman has infamously suggested that there is in fact no ‘empirical basis for the 
existence of character traits’ (1999, upagn) and here, in its most extreme form, situationists 
trivialise the relative importance of virtue to the point of doubting its very existence. This is 
hardly the situation which Anscombe had in mind. 
 
Response to the Ontological Objection 
For Hartman (2013), “becoming virtuous is a matter of reflexivity as well as habit”. This 
statement allows a residue of virtue to persist within the very phenomena which situationists 
seek to reduce to just so many instances of behavioural regularity. Such an allowance, however 
minimal, has found sustained, impassioned and formidable expression and elaboration within 
the work of Julia Annas (e.g. 2003). Her ongoing project of resuscitating virtue ethics, against 
situationist reductionism in general and Harman’s ‘eliminativism’ in particular (Annas, 2003, 
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23), reverberates within recent characterisations of the ‘unique, personal touch’ (Sison and 
Ferrero 2015, 83) highlighted in the name of virtue by contemporary Business Ethicists. The 
analysis of virtuous character formation within organisational settings, for its most penetrating 
recent proponent, is less a matter of explaining ‘persons or situations’ and more a matter of 
explaining ‘persons and situations and persons in situations’ (Alzola, 2008, 353, see also 
Alzola, 2012). Such recent defences of virtue ethics do not seek to undermine the relevance of 
social psychological insight. They rather strike a conciliatory tone, rendering social psychology 
and virtue ethics in common cause in the pursuit of a realistic moral philosophy. This is much 
more in keeping with the project which Anscombe originally had in mind.     
 
An important variation on this recent conciliatory theme had already been struck in work which 
Anscombe’s seminal article neglected to mention: John Dewey’s. Much like Annas and Alzola, 
Dewey’s account of virtuous habituation dispenses with the individual/environment dualism. 
The sense for the malleability of habit provided him with the analytical basis for arguing the 
following: 
 
Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility are 
not private possessions of a person. They are working adaptations of personal capacities 
with environing forces. All virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective 
forces. They are inter-actions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual 
with elements supplied by the out-door world. They can be studied as objectively as 
physiological functions, and they can be modified by change of either personal or social 




Character is, Dewey continues, the ‘interpenetration of habits’ (1922, 38). Without habit we 
would be nothing more than an ‘untied bundle’ of ‘isolated acts’ (Dewey 1922, 38). This means 
that for Dewey, the formation of virtuous character requires behavioural integration without 
the process being reducible to an aggregation of all integrated moments. Weak character, on 
the other hand, is a disposition ‘in which habits alternate with one another rather that embody 
one another’ (ibid). Between situational contingency and dispositional rigidity, in other words, 
we find habitual plasticity. Character, as Solomon puts it, ‘is never fully formed and settled. It 
is always vulnerable to circumstances and trauma. People change, and they are malleable’ 
(2003, 45). The findings of virtue undermining social psychological experiments, on such a 
view, reveal not so much the absence of virtue as the lack of habitually integrated virtue. For, 
as Solomon (2003, 55) reminds us, ‘one third of the subjects in the Milgram experiment did 
quit’. An appreciation of habit’s inherent plasticity allows us to explain why. Alzola’s 
important manifesto for a ‘middle way between Situationism and Dispositionalism in 
organizational scholarship and business ethics’ (Alzola, 2008, 353), to which we would lend 
our support, already had its plastic foundations set elsewhere.  
 
The Deontological Objection 
Our response to the ontological critique of virtue, which asserts that habit is malleably formed 
between the individual and the environment, doesn’t yet provide us with sufficient grounds for 
refuting the allegation that habit is mindless. Within Kantian ethics, in particular, we find the 
allegation that habit has nothing to do with virtue. This is because to act morally, for Kant, 
requires something other than ‘a mechanical habit, it requires a will to do good’ (Dierksmeier, 
2013, 605). So without the application of rational will and the corresponding sense of duty 
which grants moral action its definitively Kantian character, to be acting out of habit is to be 
19 
 
acting mindlessly, automatically, stupidly. We now turn to the delineation of and response to 
this deontological objection to habit. 
 
Kant is a deed-oriented ethicist: he provides a maxim by which deeds can be assessed as ethical, 
or otherwise. A difficulty for deontology’s advocates, both within and beyond Business Ethics, 
is that we can never know for sure whether an act is done out of a subjectively adjudicated duty 
to generalise it as a rule, or if the actor simply says, opportunistically, that s/he has been 
thinking along these lines. We can never know, in other words, if the one who says s/he 
responds to the call of duty has done so after a period of conscientious deliberation, or if s/he 
has been merely lying. If the actor genuinely believes they are acting in such a way that their 
act should be undertaken by all others in their situation, we are amidst an exemplary 
deontological act. This nuanced expectation betrays deontology’s fundamental difference from 
both virtue ethics and social psychology. Kant’s moral philosophy is less an answer to the 
question of how to life a good life and more a pronunciation of the legitimacy of the moral law. 
For Kant, therefore, ‘all habits are objectionable’ (Kant 1974, 28): they are reactions, as 
opposed to actions. As he writes: 
 
virtue cannot be defined and valued as a mere aptitude or . . . a long-standing habit of 
morally good actions, acquired by practice. For unless this aptitude results from 
considered, firm, and continually purified principles, then, like any other mechanism of 
technically-practical reason, it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately insured 
against the changes that new temptations could bring about” (Kant, 1996, 146). 
 
In both his anthropological and his moral writings, then, Kant vehemently opposes the view 
that a discussion of ethics amounts to a discussion of habits. And yet habits, according to Kant, 
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are not evil: they are, like mechanical processes, essentially without moral character. They are, 
in other words, amoral.  
 
Markedly unlike Kant’s rule based ethical procedural approaches to virtue, Aristotle insists on 
the judgment not of isolated practices but of habituated practitioners. In contrast to 
deontological appeals to duty and utilitarian appeals to consequences, then, virtue ethicists 
consider the contextual specificity of virtue and character formation to be the very key to the 
ethics puzzle (Solomon 1997). Virtue ethics therefore encourages us to assess morality not as 
the expression of underlying rules or insights but rather as the systematic execution of a set of 
observable habits which have been refined by exemplary characters over time. Kant might 
seem to focus on character to the extent that he focuses on the moral subject’s rational 
adjudication but his moral test is ultimately procedural whereas in virtue ethics there is an 
important role given to ad hominem moral assessment. Kant, with his focus on the guarantees 
provided by a good will, as opposed to the actions performed in the name of habits, apparently 
drives a wedge between habit and virtue. Aristotle, with his focus on habituation, apparently 
brings habit and virtue into proximity with one another. There is more to this superficial 
semblance of paradigmatic incommensurability, however.  
 
Response to the Deontological Objection 
Following Ravaisson, it is both possible as well as productive to consider how Kantian and 
Aristotelian ethics, rather than being understood in opposition, can be productively brought 
together in pursuit of a phenomenology of habit. At the very least, this requires us to allow for 
the possibility that habits are not fundamentally opposed to will. Ravaisson’s image of habit as 
a ‘moving middle term’ (2008, 51) indicates his work’s generous hermeneutical strategy. 
Habits, Ravaisson suggests, are not devoid of intelligence, even though they are without 
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conscious will and reflection. This is because our habits are embodied. They are built up, within 
us, over time. Morality, for Ravaisson, is therefore not a matter of exercising a good will 
beyond any habit. Morality, rather, can put our already embodied habits to work for the sake 
of the good. The difference between habit and virtue is therefore one of degree, not kind.  
 
It is on this point and many other points that the tradition which encourages our return to the 
work of Ravaisson and Dewey in particular, and to the plastic appreciation of habit more 
generally, are united. Contemporary moral philosophy cannot be grounded upon a 
metaphysical distinction between the res cogitans and the res extensa because, as these authors 
long ago knew, ethical action requires a necessarily embodied dimension.   The moral question, 
following the plastic account of habit, is not how I should get rid of my embodied habits in 
order to become virtuous. The moral question is rather one of creating what Dewey called 
‘intelligent habits’, which he opposes to ‘dead habits’ and mere ‘routines’ (Dewey 1922, 71). 
Intelligent habits, for their part, are connected to skill and art, in the Aristotelian sense of 
techne, which is itself a constituent of phronesis (e.g. Bernacer, and Murillo 2014). So if good 
guitar playing is a habit which has become embodied then so too is virtue.  
 
Embodied habits help us locate the nuances of a situation and to improvise whenever 
appropriate. Embodied habits, rather than disembodied rules, are the condition of possibility 
for any such differentiation. They are what provide us with the basis for making a difference. 
Or they are, as Malabou (2008) suggest, the repetition which makes a difference, rather than a 
rule derived action which consists in the sheer imitation of the same. Habit’s plasticity should 
therefore not be opposed to virtuous originality: ‘the most precious part of plasticity’, as Dewey 
puts it, ‘consists in the ability to form habits of independent judgment and of inventive 
initiation’ (1922, 97). Dewey, like Ravaisson, insists that the plasticity of habit does not stand 
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in opposition to will or impulse. His plastic appreciation shares with Ravaisson the sense that 
habit ‘spirals’ between instinctive behaviour and reflective and deliberate behaviour. This is, 
to repeat, a matter of degree, rather than kind. Habit is not an activity that eventually becomes 
disconnected from rational behaviour. Habit is rather an integral part of will, of creativity and 
of judgement.  
 
Consider, as Ravaisson (2008, 49) asks us to do, the distinction between the drunkard and the 
connoisseur. Both are habitual drinkers but there is nevertheless an important distinction to be 
made in terms of what they do with their habits. While the drunkard moves down along the 
spiral towards the eventually non-reflective place of addiction, the connoisseur develops a 
refined sensibility towards nuance and so with it a heightened - at its highest exemplary - 
capacity for discernment. This is a gastronomical distinction but its moral instructiveness 
should not be denied. Much like a connoisseur in matters of aesthetic taste, the morally virtuous 
person is characterised by an embodied sensibility to the nuances of a given context. The 
distinction between thoughtless addiction and thoughtful grace therefore doesn’t require us to 
place habit on one side of amorality and virtue on the other. It requires us, instead, to realise 
that those we call virtuous know better than the non-virtuous what they should do with their 
habits. In this they set an example of habituation which others might follow. Followers, just 
like those they follow, will express the habitual capacity for moral improvisation which the 
notion of plasticity would lead us to expect, albeit to a less exemplary extent.  
 
It could certainly be injected that this is not always the case: that actions can be repeated 
without virtue being born. The solution to this problem, however, is not to be found in rejecting 
habit’s claim to morality as such. For it is in the plasticity related to habit that we  discover 
why some do not accept what Ravaisson considered the grace of habit. If habit is ontologically 
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marked by a combination of receptivity and resistance towards the outside, it is this very 
relationship that can help us account for ‘the possibility of refusing’ (Carlisle 2010, 138) the 
virtues that are given trough habit.  
 
The Communitarian Objection 
Even if, against what we’ve called the ontological objection, we can clarify the psychological 
way in which virtue persists within habit, and even if, against what we’ve called the 
deontological objection, we can qualify the moral character of habitual action, a final objection 
remains. Habituation, those who work within what we’re calling a communitarian tradition, 
occurs not at the level of the isolated subject but rather at the level of the common group. It is 
to the negotiation of this final objection, and its two major strands (the political-philosophical 
and the sociological) that we will now turn. As with before, once we’ve outlined the objection, 
we will proceed to mount our plasticity oriented defence. 
 
Habits, those beholden to both strands of the communitarian objection insist, aren’t actions 
which individuals undertake as a matter of inner-directed personal discretion. Habits, rather, 
are actions which individuals undertake as a means of collective participation. Habits, 
according to this position, are not a process of a solipsistic soul-searching’s having become 
deed. Rather habits, for the communitarian, are an ongoing process of recursive-iterative group-
participation: they both signify a collective’s own continuity and inform the manner of an 
individual’s contribution to that collective. The habits of a collective are nevertheless 
irreducible to the outcome of any aggregation exercise, however complicated that exercise 




This is not simply a matter of allowing the concepts of synergy or discord to explain away the 
difference between the group and the sum of its constituent individuals, however. The 
communitarian objection to moral individualism is much more radical. Community virtues and 
individual virtues are irreducible in principle, the communitarian insists, not because they are 
different in degree but because they are different in kind. So while the political-philosophical 
and the sociological strands of the objection differ in their details, they are united in their shared 
objection to the naïve empiricist depiction of habit along methodologically individualist lines. 
The group, for the communitarian, is other than the sum of its parts. So it should be with any 
account of the relationship between virtue and habit. 
 
The political-philosophical variant of this objection is most apparent in the work of Alasdair 
MacIntyre. Inspired by Anscombe’s manifesto for a social-psychological resuscitation of virtue 
ethics, on the one hand (2007, 53), and by Marx’s critique of political economy, on the other 
(2007, xiii), MacIntyre suggested that it is within specific communities, through their everyday 
practices, that individuals form their senses of virtue and of vice. So whereas for Aristotle, 
Ethics underpinned Politics, MacIntyre suggested that we should look both to the communities 
which individuals find themselves in, and to the individuals which constitute these 
communities, when analyzing contemporary morality. His framework, he insisted, is developed 
for analytic rather than dogmatic reasons. Whatever value After Virtue has, writes MacIntyre, 
resides not in its rhetorical capitulation to collectivism but in its realistic explanation of what 
contemporary virtue is. In the third prologue to his now classical text he makes a deliberate 




defenders of liberal and individualist modernity…frame their objections in terms of the 
liberalism versus communitarian debate, supposing me to be a communitarian, 
something that I have never been (2007, xii).  
 
We attribute the label ‘communitarianism’ to MacIntyre quite advisedly, therefore. Our use of 
it here indicates that MacIntyre’s account of virtue’s relationship to habit constitutes the 
‘community’ as an object of analysis, rather than as an object of affirmation. His line of self-
clarification outlined above continues in the paragraph cited below and it is in this qualified 
sense that we speak of his work as analytically ‘communitarian’: 
 
My own critique of liberalism derives from a judgment that the best type of human life, 
that in which the tradition of the virtues is most adequately embodied, is lived by those 
engaged in constructing and sustaining forms of community directed towards the shared 
achievement of those common goods without which the ultimate human good cannot 
be achieved…what liberalism promotes is a kind of institutional order that is inimical 
to the construction and sustaining of the types of communal relationship required for 
the best kind of human life (ibid.) 
 
Not only does MacIntyre set his account of virtue out in opposition to political dogmatism, 
however, he also attempts to distinguish it from corporate managerialism. His dismissal of 
business ethics, in particular, is scornful of what he sees as its advocate’s elitist pretense 
towards exclusionary self-congratulation (2007, xiii). A community is not a community, for 
MacIntyre, if it particularizes authority in a manner which has not met with majoritarian 
consent. So if a community – corporate or otherwise - fails to encourage an individual’s 
flourishing or, worse still, if it denies meaningful activity to that individual, then it is the 
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community, rather than the individual, to which the virtuously impoverished modes of 
habituation are to be attributed (Beadle, 2002).  
 
The sociological variant of the communitarian critique of habit shares the political 
philosophical dissatisfaction with moral individualism, also for non-normative reasons. The 
very discipline of sociology, according to Charles Camic (1986), just about survived a lengthy 
period of avoiding the concept of habit for its chief practitioner’s justifiable fear of being 
defeated upon the psychologist’s terrain. Habitus, a concept most readily associated with the 
work of Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias, was one of the conceptual consequences of these 
long-standing and still ongoing disciplinary turf wars. Along Bourdieu-inspired lines (2010) 
habitus provides the sociologist with a means of initially conceptualizing then subsequently 
analysing how moral and aesthetic values are contested between actors. Such values are taken 
to be socially relational, rather than individually inherent, from the outset. Along Eliasian lines, 
the concept of habitus provides the sociologist with an analytic mechanism through which 
unintended consequences of intended moral action seem more likely, though never inevitable 
(1997). The historical-sociological dynamics of habituation, for Elias, are always much more 
complicated than any moralist would have us believe. Together with Bourdieu, he represents a 
more general sociological critique of any individual’s habit’s claims upon virtue.   
 
Response to the Communitarian Objection 
In both its political philosophical and the sociological variety, what we’ve called 
communitarianism fervently opposes the epistemological and ontological assumptions which 
characterize contemporary methodological individualism in particular, and solipsistic 
philosophical anthropology more generally. For MacIntyre, the community is part of any 
individual’s prospects of and capacities for virtuous habituation. For Bourdieu and Elias, 
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‘habitus’ precipitates the dissolution of sociology’s structure/agency problem. Their shared 
disdain for liberal epistemology in general and methodological individualism in particular is 
very much of a piece with all that we have written so far in the name of the plasticity of habit. 
Here’s John Dewey, for example, sounding remarkably like MacIntyre in his cautioning against 
the hubris of anti-populist, anti-majoritarian, political and economic managerialism: 
 
Those who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and 
thought, action and soul, so characteristic of history. For the dualism enables them to 
do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile, even if awkward, 
instruments of execution (Dewey 1922, 72) 
 
Dewey worries, more specifically, about how the emergence of a specifically managerialist 
class narrows the scope of the role played by the democratic process in the specification of a 
good life lived in common. Instead of democracy, we have technocracy. These words strike us 
today with an air of prophecy as do, less distantly, MacIntyre’s. This emergent managerialism 
isn’t only morally suspicious, Dewey writes, it is also analytically dubious. Here he is again, 
also in Human Nature and Conduct, this time sounding very much like Bourdieu and Elias: 
  
We often fancy that institutions, social custom, collective habit, have been formed by 
the consolidation of individual habits. In the main this supposition is false to fact. To a 
considerable extent customs, or wide-spread uniformities of habit, exist because 
individuals face the same situation and react in like fashion. But to a larger extent 
customs persist because individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by 
prior customs. An individual usually acquires the morality as he inherits the speech of 
his social group. The activities of the group are already there, and some assimilation of 
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his own acts to their pattern is a pre-requisite of a share therein, and hence of having 
any part in what is going on (Dewey 1922, 57). 
 
Dewey’s plastic account of habit preempts aspects of MacIntyre’s communitarianism by 
prioritizing processes of collective negotiation above the hubris of top-down imposition. It also 
preempts Bourdieu and Elias’s break from the structure-agency dichotomy by highlighting how 
habit – and habitus - is an object neither for methodological individualism nor structural 
determinism. Habit, rather, is always negotiated by individuals within environments. The 
manner of this negotiation cannot be known in advance. Rather, it is the role of the analyst to 
track habit, over time,  how there are formed through what Ravaisson called the double law of 
habit within concrete settings, across what Bourdieu (2010) would later call ‘fields’ and what 
Elias would later call ‘lengthening chains of human interdependency’ (1984). Between the 
communitarian and the virtue ethicist, there exists a lot of common ground waiting to be 
explored.  
 
Argument from Intervention Objection Response 
Situationism Evidence Virtuous habits don’t 
exist 
Plasticity explains the 
dynamic relationship 
between individual and 
environment  
Deontology Good Will Habits are never virtuous Habit spirals between 








antithetical to democracy 
Sociological 
Communitarianism  
Habitus Habitus is dynamically 
contested and 
unforeseeable  
Habit change programme 
unpredictability is 
complicated by multiple 
agents 
 




IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSINESS ETHICS 
Capping off an exemplary rendition of The Nicomachean Ethics, Bragues (2006) pronounced 
a many pointed manifesto of what Aristotelian virtue ethics can still offer Business Ethicists. 
We hope to channel something of that spirit here by affirming seven practical consequences 
which follow from our synthetic conceptualisation of virtue’s malleability. These seven 
characteristics of highly effective virtue habituation projects, as we might call them, pay a 
slightly ironic homage to a much more widely celebrated, though far from exemplary, Aristotle 
rendition.   
     
1. Habit is more a disposition that guide change that a mechanism that resist change. 
Executives should avoid reducing habit to something that blocks changes in general 
and moral development in particular. This requires less an appreciation of habit as some 
mindless repetition and more an appreciation of habit as a plastic disposition in us all. 
Change managers, in particular, should refocus their concern away from efforts 
designed to avoid or break habits and towards an acknowledgment of the ubiquity of 
individual habits as both resistant towards, and receptive to, any change. This starts 
with admitting that an acquired habit is not a state brought about by a cue, but a 
disposition that anticipates future actions.   
 
2. Habits form our character. Executives should recognize habit’s ubiquity. As a recent 
editorial put it: ‘We begin to learn ethics by habituation, and employees already have 
ethical (or unethical) habits’ (Sison, Hartman and Fontrodona 2012, 209). We can all 
change our habits, bad and good but not in the same way and at the same pace. Habits 
are deeply embodied over time in us. Habit is, as Ravaisson (2008, 52) argued ‘beyond, 
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beneath the region of will, personality and consciousness’. To change one habit is to 
change one-self.  
 
3. To change habit is to change the act, as well as the intention. Executives must avoid 
the assumption that the encouragement of ethical business practices is predicated upon 
the moral enlightenment of individuals. This is not to say that good intentions have 
nothing to do with ethics. It is only to take habits as seriously as they need to be taken. 
To change habits is not solely a matter of acknowledging moral problems before 
making a firm ethical commitment towards putting them right. To intervene in habit is 
to intervene at the level of sensations and involuntary thoughts, slowly cultivating these 
in other ways.  
 
4. Habits are formed between individuals and their environment. Executives should not 
reduce habits to individuals. To think the individual’s character can be converted from 
‘worse to better’ (1922, 20), by ‘preaching good will’ or by working on ‘the hearts of 
men’ (1922, 22) is nothing short of a belief in ‘magic’ as Dewey (1922,  20) puts it. We 
can change habits, rather, ‘by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and 
weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfilment of 
desires’ (1922, 20). This does not mean, however, that individual habits are mere 
environmental products. Plasticity ensures that any individual can respond differently 
to the same cue. Habitual plasticity is built up by all of us over time. The solution, if it 
can be called such, is to privilege both the individual and the environment.  
 
5. We change habits, they change us. Executives much find a way of responding to habit’s 
paradox: repetition is constituent of, rather than opposed to, the new. As Grosz 
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characterises Ravaisson’s work, habit transforms ‘the constrained into degree of 
freedom, degrees of openness’ (2013, 234). It does this by introducing ’the needs of the 
organism to its environment and inserting its environment into the behaviour of the 
organism’ (2013, 234). To acknowledge the plasticity in habit is to acknowledge that 
the repetition of habit not only constrain and resist change. It also conditions our 
openness and capability to change by initiating a disposition within our very potential 
to change. 
 
6. Habits are virtuous and vicious. Important as they are, habits provide executives with 
no ethical panacea. Habits can both diminish the effort in our activities and blind us to 
the effects of our actions. This relates to what Malabou describes as the pharmakon of 
habit (2008): cure and poison, grace and addiction. Habits are the basis of moral 
betterment in that they give consistency to our ever-changing involvements. But habits 
are also the rut we get stuck in which disrupts even our best intentions.   
 
7. Changing habits within business are always an ethical concern. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the moral duplicity of habit means that executives must recognise 
plasticity’s lack of a clear normative principle. At best, it helps articulate a sense for the 
conditions for ethical behavioural change. The habits of an individual are both what 
blocks moral betterment and also what builds it. The point is not to differentiate 
between good habits and bad habits. The point is rather that in so far as habit is 
connected to our plasticity as human beings, their very discussion is always an ethical 
one. On the one hand, habit automatically opens up moral questions: should we conduct 
ourselves otherwise?, should we regulate corporations otherwise?, should we undertake 
politics otherwise? On the other hand, habit automatically provides us with a way of 
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understanding any ethical demand: there can be habits without virtue but there can be 
no virtue without habits 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have argued that Business Ethics have much to gain from the habit research 
renaissance’s accounts of the embodied nature of habit’s plasticity and of habituation’s double-
law. We described habit’s plasticity and overviewed its relevance to discussions of virtue. 
Habit, in the words of Ravaisson, is a ‘moving middle term’ between will and necessity. It is 
an embodied intelligence which eventually diminishes effort. This diminishment requires a 
repetition which makes a difference to who we are and what we can do - it forms how we 
interact with ourselves and the world. 
 
In particular, we argued that Ravaisson and Dewey’s reflections on the plasticity of habit 
provide contemporary virtue ethicists with a means of responding to three of their most 
outspoken critics: situationist social-psychologists; deontological ethicists and communitarian 
analysts. The habit renaissance responds to the social-psychologist debunking of notions of 
character by complicating the distinction between person and environment  and  thus our 
everyday assumptions about what it means to change behavior. It responds to deontology’s 
claim that habits are pure mechanisms and senseless imitations by reminding us of the 
embodiment of our moral virtues and vices. And it responds to communitarian critique by 
pointing out that our habits are not our own but in a dynamic relationship to our surroundings.  
 
Such a plastic appreciation of habit provides a basis for understanding how virtuous habituation 
occurs. It helps us to understand how virtues and vices take hold within our moral development, 
constantly interacting with our ever changing environments. Our habits modulate how we 
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interact with ourselves and the world. The plasticity of habit ensures that we each have the 
capacity to craft a virtuous life out of whatever we habitually repeat both within and beyond 
Business. 
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